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Introduction

“The idea of groups of individually powerless citizens potentially banding
together to gain strength in numbers and stand up to powerful interests – the idea,
in short, of political action – was now up against a far more seductive approach.
That approach was the winners of the world deciding what and how much
largesse to give, or concentrating on the Venn diagram overlap of solutions to the
underdogs’ problems that also served them – and doing just enough of these
things to keep at bay that very explosive impulse of banding together.”
-

Anand Giridharadas, Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing
the World1

In 2018, reporter Anand Giridharadas made a splash with Winners Take All, a book
documenting the culture of philanthropy that has arisen among the elites of the 21st century. His
core argument is not just that this charity is woefully inadequate to meet the needs of the modern
poor, not just that America ought to tax the rich more heavily to curb wealth inequality. His
argument goes a step further by saying that charity is actively detrimental to these reforms, that it
serves to quell demands for greater government action, by making it seem to people that the
problem is being addressed and that government action is unnecessary. This is a common
argument among advocates of welfare, wealth redistribution, and other government actions to
benefit poor people, particularly in the American context.
However, Shirley May Tillotson, writing about Canada, comes to a different conclusion.
In Contributing Citizens: Modern Charitable Fundraising and the Making of the Welfare State,
1

Anand Giridharadas, Winners Take All: The Elite Fantasy of Changing the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2018), 68.
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1920-1966, she argues that far from quelling demands for government action, charitable
fundraising in Canada actually contributed to the calls for welfare in the first half of the 20th
century. Focusing on “community chests”’ or organizations that performed fundraising and
advertising on behalf of every charity in a given city or province, she argues that these
organizations created the demand for welfare by bringing attention to a problem that they could
not solve. It was in the interests of these organizations to bring public attention to the problem of
poverty in Canada, but these charities consistently fell short of their goals of helping these
impoverished people. From there, both charities and ordinary people had an incentive to support
greater welfare in Canada – the charities wanted welfare to ease their own load so that they could
deal with a problem they could more easily address, and ordinary people had become more
sympathetic to the plight of the poor and wanted to see them helped. Certainly, this is not the
only factor that led to the development of Canada’s welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, but
Tilloston’s argument is a persuasive one, and cuts against the idea that there is a direct trade-off
between charity and government action.
Tilloston’s account opens up an alternative way of thinking about the role of charity in
the development of welfare, not just in Canada but in other countries as well. Whereas
Giridharadas proposes that charity can divert attention away from welfare, the historical account
in Contributing Citizens suggests that charity can actually make the development of welfare
programs more likely. This approach, however, presents an interesting problem when applied to
the United States. The U.S. is well-known as a welfare laggard, with no other industrialized
democracy lacking a program of universal healthcare or having as few programs such as
unemployment insurance that benefit poor people. The question of why America lacks welfare
is a well-trodden path in academia, with various theories having been put forth. But
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Contributing Citizens suggests there must be a part of the story that previous explanations have
missed. After all, America is not lacking in philanthropy – in fact, a study of 23 countries by the
Charities Aid Foundation found America to be the leader in percentage of GDP given to
non-profit organizations, with a percentage almost twice as high as New Zealand, the
second-place country.2 So why have charitable donations not resulted in increased demands for
welfare in America, as they did in Canada?
The answer, I have found, lies firstly in differences between the way that charitable
giving operated in America as compared to Canada, and secondly in differences in America’s
political culture, institutional factors, and degree of working class organization as compared to
Canada’s that made this route to welfare an unlikely one. Charitable giving in America has been
more focused on temporary ‘blitzes’ of giving, rather than sustained campaigns for donations,
setting the precedent for temporary relief programs as seen during the Great Depression rather
than welfare. Charitable giving in America was also greatly associated with the First World War,
setting a precedent for military benefits that has continued through programs such as the G.I. Bill
and the benefits for soldiers that we continue to see today. Finally, charities in America often
actively rejected the aid of the government, whereas Canadian charities directly lobbied the
government for greater assistance. Meanwhile, there are three factors exogenous to charities that
meant that even if charities had shifted public opinion towards wanting to help poor people, it
still may not have been enough to trigger greater welfare development. Firstly, due to the effects
of the Second Red Scare, America had a political culture that strongly opposed communist ideas.
Welfare programs were among the policies that became politically taboo as a result, as welfare

2

“Gross Domestic Philanthropy: An International Analysis of GDP, Tax, and Giving.” Charities Aid Foundation,
January 2016,
https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-policy-and-campaigns/gross-domestic-philanthropy-feb-201
6.pdf.
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programs involve expanding government power in order to help the poor, a means and end that
were seen to be in alignment with communism. Secondly, business power in America rose
sharply after the end of the Great Depression, and businesses tended to oppose welfare in favor
of programs that encouraged full employment, as the former increased the bargaining power of
workers against businesses. Finally, commensurate to this increase in business power was a drop
in the power of organized labor, due to the application of a variety of new methods by employers
to decrease union membership, such as the passage of “right to work” laws and
employer-provided benefits that were designed to make unionization seem less necessary. In
sum, the argument I will advance in this project is that the combined effect of the different
operations of charities and the different surrounding political context in America, compared to
Canada, resulted in charities having very little effect on welfare development in America, and in
some ways perhaps even resulting in less welfare development.
This research is important because it is suggestive of a new way to understand the
relationship between the activities of charities and welfare development. In my research, I found
a few arguments, both in and out of academia, that discussed this relationship, but it was always
in a binary form, asking the question, ‘Is charity good, or bad for welfare development?’
However, the observation that two countries with high degrees of charity activity had different
levels of welfare development prompts a more nuanced way that we might ask this question, one
that as far as I can tell, has not yet been seriously explored in academia: what kind of charity
activity is good for welfare development, and what kind is bad for welfare development? This
suggests a new consideration for altruistic people who work for, or donate to, charities, and who
want to have a positive impact on the world. Charity activity can be adjusted not just to
maximize the positive impact of the charity itself, but can also be adjusted to have a positive
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impact on the way that people think about poverty and what the ideal solution to poverty might
be. Neither Giridharadas nor Tilloston tell the full story – charities in themselves are neither
necessarily good nor bad for welfare. Instead, their contribution varies depending both on how
the charities themselves operate, and on their cultural and political context.

Definitions
To provide clarity to the argument that will follow, it will be necessary to define some
terms that will be used throughout.
Firstly, a distinction must be made between philanthropy and charity. Philanthropy refers
to the process of people voluntarily donating their money to an organization, without the
expectation of receiving a product or service in return (or perhaps only a symbolic product or
service, such as a donor’s name appearing on a plaque in a relevant location). Mass philanthropy
refers specifically to when these donations come from wide swaths of ordinary people; elite
philanthropy, by contrast, comes from the wealthy. A philanthropic organization is any
organization that makes significant money through donations. A charity is a type of
philanthropic organization that specifically aims to help a group of people who are defined as
being in need somehow. Such groups include poor people, people afflicted with certain diseases,
people who have been affected by a natural disaster or conflict, and veterans, among others. Not
all philanthropic organizations are charities. For example, many colleges in America are
philanthropic organizations, because a significant percentage of their budget comes from
donations from rich people; however, they are not charities, because they use this money to
provide a paid service to the most talented students that apply, rather than a group of people
considered to be in need. This project will be mainly focused on the activities of charities
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engaging in mass philanthropy. This is because Tilloston’s argument, that charities spread
awareness about a problem of poverty in Canada that they were then unable to solve, applies
only to mass philanthropy (since elite philanthropy requires no widely-accessible advertising,
and thus has little ability to shape public consciousness), and applies only to charities, not other
philanthropic organizations.
Next, welfare refers to governmental policies made to assist citizens of a country in
providing for their basic needs. Some of these policies, such as state-provided health insurance
or government pension programs (such as America’s social security program) may apply to all
citizens regardless of income level; others, such as America’s SNAP program, may apply
specifically for poor people. Welfare is distinct from wealth redistribution, in that the goal of
wealth redistribution is to decrease the level of wealth inequality in society, while the goal of
welfare is simply to allow people to meet their basic needs, regardless of any inequality beyond
this point. Programs like public education or the construction of public parks or libraries are also
generally not considered welfare, as these programs aim to provide services to citizens beyond
allowing them to meet their basic needs. Welfare development, for the purposes of this project,
refers to the process by which policies enacting welfare are passed in a particular country.
Generally in this project, I discuss the degree to which welfare development did or did not occur.
For example, in America, there was some welfare development in the realm of public healthcare
in the mid 20th century in the form of Medicaid and Medicare, as part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Great Society program, but there was a lower degree of welfare development than there was in
Canada or the United Kingdom around the same time, both of which enacted programs of
universal health insurance for their populations in the mid 20th century.

10
Outline of Argument
This thesis will contain two sections. In the first section, I will outline the ways
that American charity functioned that was different from how Canadian charity
functioned. I will describe the “blitz” strategy employed by American community chest
campaigners, and I will explain how this approach created a precedent for temporary
relief programs, rather than permanent welfare programs, setting the stage for much of
the New Deal. I will then explain the importance of World War I to the rise of American
mass philanthropy, and draw a link between the precedent that this set for donating to
benefit the military and the G.I. Bill as a replacement for many of the welfare programs
that Canada put in place after World War II. In the second section, I will highlight
various reasons involving America’s political culture that, even to the extent that charities
made Americans more aware of poverty, this was not enough to spurn Americans to do
anything about it. I will talk about the broad (although not universal) consensus after
World War II that the government should pursue full employment, rather than welfare, as
a means to fix poverty. I will also talk about the environment of the second red scare,
during the 50’s, that stifled discussions of welfare programs after the Second World War.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review

Before we can answer the question of why America’s charities failed to accelerate
welfare development in America, a more basic question must first be answered: why did
America enact less welfare than Europe in the first place? This question is a subset of the
broader question of why any institutional or policy change occurs differently in different
countries. This section will outline several approaches for explaining divergent institutional
developments across the world that range in generality, with some focusing specifically on
welfare and other policies that benefit the poor, and others focusing more broadly on any change
that might happen to a government. These approaches are characterized here into three broad
approaches - political culture, working class mobilization, and institutional development. In
summarizing these theories, I will focus primarily on literature that explains the particular
question of why America is a welfare laggard compared to other industrialized democracies. In
doing so, I will give particular attention to the period of 1920-1960, as this is the period in which
Canada and most of western Europe established many of their largest welfare programs, in
particular their programs of universal healthcare. After having offered a discussion of the
theories, I provided an account of welfare development in Canada. This account suggests that
political culture may best capture the role of charities in the development of welfare, and as such
will provide the lense through which to explore the role of charities in the development of
welfare in the United States.
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Approaches to Explaining Welfare Development
Political culture
One approach to understanding welfare development is to look at a country’s unique
political culture. A political culture, also called a country’s ‘national values,’ refers to the norms
around what sorts of ideas and policies are considered to be worthy of consideration. By limiting
the realm of what can be suggested by politicians, a country’s political culture narrows the scope
of what policies can be passed. This approach tends to be most useful in explaining broad trends
in a nation’s political development; political culture can be understood as the ‘general direction’
that a country is likely to head in any particular time. It tends to be less useful in explaining the
outcomes of individual policy debates, as there are always confounding variables in any one
instance that might push against a country’s political culture.
In American political studies, the political culture approach is taken most famously by
Louis Hartz in The Liberal Tradition in America. His thesis is that American politics can be
explained largely by a consensus around “fixed dogmatic liberalism,” as America lacks a
“genuine revolutionary tradition,” in the absence of a feudal order for liberal ideas to respond to.3
Hartz applies this idea to explain the absence of socialism in America by positing that a
consensus around liberalism made ideas based in other political philosophies unacceptable, citing
McCarthyism as an example of this tyranny of unanimity playing out.4 In his chapter about the
New Deal, Hartz posits that the New Deal “sought to extend the sphere of the state and at the
same time retain the principles of Locke and Bentham.”5 The suggestion of such a Hartzian
approach, is that the result of such dogmatic liberalism was a weaker welfare system than was
seen in other industrialized nations.
3

Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), 5-9.
Ibid, 11-12.
5
Ibid, 259.
4
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The conception of American political culture as a ‘liberal consensus’ has been
highly contested by numerous scholars writing after Hartz. For example, in “Beyond
Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz,” Rogers Smith argues for a ‘multiple traditions’ theory
that suggests that the egalitarian values of liberalism compete against a tradition that he
calls ‘ascriptive Americanist,’ an ideological tradition that justifies hierarchy.6 Under this
approach, discrimination in America should be seen not as an aberration from liberal
values, but as a powerful ideological approach in its own right. Smith, along with
Desmond King, elaborates on this thesis in “Racial Orders in American Political
Development,” where the authors analyze this thesis in the specific context of racism in
America. They argue that the driver of change in American politics is the alignment of
actors in the center of the divide between the liberal and the ascriptive Americanist
traditions, who do not fully subscribe to the beliefs of either one but may ally themselves
with one camp or the other out of political convenience or necessity. They cite Andrew
Johnson’s alliance with southern Democrats after the Civil War and Harry S. Truman’s
alliance with northern Democrats over southern Dixiecrats as two examples of times that
the actions of moderates not fully aligned with either camp were definitive in American
political development.7 Although Smith and King do not seek to explain the United
States’ constrained welfare state directly, their work can be applied to welfare
development, for which egalitarian forces in America tend to advocate. The New Deal,
under this conception, can be explained by Franklin Roosevelt taking a compromise
position to gain support from both the egalitarian and the ascriptivist orders – on the one

6

Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” The American
Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 558.
7
Desmond King and Rogers M. Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” The American Political
Science Review 99, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 76
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hand, New Deal programs helped the poor, but on the other hand, their locally controlled
application allowed southern states to exclude African-Americans from their benefits.
While both of these variations of the approach discuss continuities in American
political culture throughout its history, this is not to suggest that political culture cannot
change over time. Indeed, political culture is subject to constant small alterations as the
consensus surrounding what ideas are acceptable changes over time. These alterations
can add up to seismic shifts over time. For example, while there are many continuities in
how American political culture views gender, the idea that women can be active
participants in American politics is now far less controversial than it was a hundred years
ago. This is important, because as we will see later in this chapter, the actions of
Canadian charities triggered a shift in Canadian political culture, by making it easier to
justify government intervention to help poor people.

Working class mobilization
If charities triggered a shift in Canada’s political culture, the next two theories
will describe the context in which that shift happened. This is to say, political culture is
not the only thing that affects welfare development; other factors, that remain unchanged
by the activities of charities, must be taken into account as well. One approach to
accounting for these factors is to examine the degree of working class mobilization in
society. Michael Shalev outlines this approach in “The Social Democratic Model and
Beyond: Two ‘Generations’ of Comparative Research on the Welfare State.” According
to Shalev, this model assumes that the primary political divides in governance all along
class lines, with left-leaning organizations tending to represent the poorer classes of
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society. The model also assumes that left-leaning organizations tend to advocate for and
implement welfare programs, as these programs tend to benefit poor people. As a result,
the model postulates that the degree of welfare proliferation in society depends on the
degree that lower classes can mobilize, through methods such as labor unions and
political parties.8
This model is useful in explaining America’s outlier status in welfare
development, because America has a much lower degree of working class organization
than other developed nations, as documented by scholars such as Mike Davis. In
Prisoners of the American Dream, Davis describes a number of historical factors that
lead to lower levels of collective identification among America’s working class, resulting
in lower levels of unionization and the absence of an enduring labor/socialist party.
These factors include a history of frontier expansion that stole Native American land and
made many poor white Americans landowners, aligning their interests with the upper
classes towards the protection of property rights; an elite class who largely did not oppose
democracy for poor white men, meaning that poor people in America did not organize
against the wealthy to the same degree that poor Europeans did; and racial and ethinc
divides, based on anti-Black racism and xenophobia, that made the prospect of a
completely unified working class difficult to realize.9
In reality, of course, the assumption that the poor universally support welfare and
the rich universally oppose it obscures complications. Social classes never uniformly
support any particular policy as a bloc, and different countries may see different degrees

8

Michael Shalev, “The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two ‘Generations’ of Comparative Research on the
Welfare State,” Comparative Social Research 6, no. 3 (1983): 319-320.
9
Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class
(London: Verso, 1986), 11-17.
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of support for welfare among different social classes. Shalev addresses this complication
by exploring the motivations that different social classes have for supporting or opposing
welfare. He argues that while sometimes the rich oppose welfare due to the increased
taxation it requires, rich people sometimes support welfare – so long as it does not
significantly disrupt the free market – because it contributes to the reproduction of a
stable labor force.10 As a result, Shalev suggests that, all else being equal, developed
nations may have the same degree of welfare, but that nations with high degrees of
working class organization may have welfare that is more universally applied, whereas
nations with less working class organization may have welfare that is means-tested, thus
driving wedges among the working class and limiting the number of people who benefit
from the welfare.11 Moreover, Shalev points to the fact that working class parties and
organizations do not universally support welfare as a solution to their problems – for
example, sometimes the working class supports market interventions that lead to full
employment, aiding poor people through creating jobs (whether directly, as in many New
Deal programs, or simply by stimulating economic growth that employs more people)
rather than through direct provision of money and resources.12 I would add the
observation – ignored by Shalev – that working class organizations also frequently
support wealth redistribution and a more substantial overhaul of capitalism, rather than
welfare, which more radical working class groups tend to characterize as inadequate to
bring about justice. None of this is to say that working class organization cannot cause
welfare to come about, but it does complicate an account that posits a straightforward
correlation.
10

Shalev, 325.
Ibid, 325-326.
12
Ibid, 332.
11
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Institutional approach
The final way to explain why some nations have welfare programs and others do
not – and the final approach that provides the context in which charities change political
culture – is to look at a country’s unique government structures. This approach suggests
that the definitive factor to whether or not welfare arises is the form that institutions – in
this case, the governments of the various countries in question – take. Under this
approach, the enactment of a welfare policy is a change in an institution, and the relevant
question is how the organization of the government allows or does not allow for this
change to take place. Paul Pierson discusses the institutional approach to understanding
government change in Politics in Time. In this book, he suggests that institutions may
change dramatically, either as a result of ‘triggers’ or as a result of events that make an
old state of being untenable for an institution and prompt it to change; or they may
change more gradually, due to concerted efforts towards reform from the inside or the
outside.13 He also identifies several factors that may make institutions resilient to change,
such as veto points (or extra steps in a process of enacting a change that allow an actor to
block the change, such as Presidential veto power), and the degree to which various
actors inside and outside the institution make arrangements contingent on an institution
staying the way it is, thereby making change undesirable.14
Pierson, along with Jacob S. Hacker, apply this approach to welfare in America in
“Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American
Welfare State.” They argue that businesses in America have ‘structural power,’ or power
13

Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 134-139.
14
Ibid, 146,148.
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arising from their position of importance in the economy. Specifically, politicians often
find it undesirable to enact policies that harm businesses, because businesses downsizing,
closing, or moving elsewhere results in constituents losing their jobs and decreased tax
revenue.15 This structural power is greatest over state governments, because it is easier
for businesses to move from one state to another than to move out of the U.S. altogether
if an unfavorable policy is enacted.16 Alongside this structural power, businesses might
have varying degrees of ‘instrumental power’ over governments, which refers to their
ability to directly lobby the government for policies that they support.17 Pierson and
Hacker argue that for the first three decades of the 20th century, businesses held both
massive structural power, due to the enormous profits made by large businesses such as
Standard Oil and the Carnegie Steel Company, as well as massive instrumental power,
due to the high degree of business capture in the Republican Party.18 Businesses tended
to dislike welfare, because it could only be funded by higher taxes and because it made
workers less reliant on businesses, thus increasing their bargaining power when
demanding higher pay or shorter hours.19 As a result, welfare policies tended not to pass,
unless they were modest in scope (and thus requiring little taxes) and they benefited
groups such as elderly people, disabled people, or women, who were not expected to be
employed by businesses.20 Hacker and Pierson also highlight the various veto points
within the American government structure, especially at the federal level, that made
policy extremely difficult to pass without a widespread consensus. These veto points
15

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the
American Welfare State,” Politics and Society 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 281.
16
Ibid, 283.
17
Ibid, 283.
18
Ibid, 288.
19
Ibid, 293.
20
Ibid, 291.
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included the presence of a bicameral legislature – meaning that any bill must be approved
twice, by two bodies with a different partisan makeup – a Presidential veto, and the
judicial review of the Supreme Court, which before the Great Depression operated under
a very narrow and restrictive reading of the Interstate Commerce Clause.21
From there, Hacker and Pierson analyze the Great Depression as a trigger for
institutional change, greatly decreasing the significance of both business power and veto
points. Structural business power decreased because, after so many businesses had
already failed or significantly decreased in size, the prospect of further business failure
seemed less like a problem.22 Additionally, instrumental business powers decreased
because the Democratic Party – especially southern Democrats, who mostly represented
rural districts with fewer large businesses – had far fewer business ties than the
Republican Party.23 Finally, the importance of veto points functionally decreased due to
the sweeping victories of the Democratic Party in the elections of 1932, 1934, and 1936,
where they secured the Presidency and enormous majorities in both houses of Congress,
leaving the Supreme Court as the only meaningful veto point in the federal government.24
This unusual set of circumstances allowed Roosevelt to pass far more policy than would
otherwise have been possible, and the New Deal, a sudden and dramatic increase in
welfare spending by the federal government, was the result. As the Great Depression
ended, however, American politics gradually returned to normalcy; the recovering
economy increased the structural power of businesses, and Democrats lost their

21

Ibid, 288.
Ibid, 297.
23
Ibid, 298.
24
Ibid, 297.
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overwhelming majorities.25 This can explain the general lack of further welfare policies
enacted after the Great Depression.

The Canadian Case
In order to understand the effects of charity on welfare development in America,
it is useful to understand how charity fits into the approaches I have described above.
The clearest way to do this is to examine the Canadian case, and see how these theories
explain what happened in Canada.
Contributing Citizens by Shirley May Tilloston, suggests that the development of
Canadian welfare programs such as the enactment of universal healthcare, the expansion
of unemployment relief to able-bodied workers, and the enactment of family allowances
to help poorer families with children, was facilitated by a culture of charitable giving that
arose during the first half of the twentieth century. She makes this argument by
describing the workings of and the discourse around ‘community chests,’ organizations
that, although forgotten today outside of the Monopoly square that bears their name, were
the primary vehicles of charitable fundraising in the first half of the twentieth century.
These organizations took on the task of raising money for all of the charities in a given
city, and distributed the money raised to these charities in a somewhat even fashion, with
the goal of making fundraising more efficient by centralizing it. Tilloston firstly
identifies two aspects of charitable giving that, by becoming an accepted part of Canadian
political culture, normalized the concept of a tax-funded welfare system: widespread
awareness of societal problems such as poverty, and the idea that giving one’s money to
solve these problems is a social obligation. Tilloston then describes the failures of
25

Ibid, 305.

21
charities to fix the poverty that they had made Canadians aware of, prompting popular
support for the government to solve these problems.
The first element of charitable giving that, by becoming part of popular culture,
facilitated popular support for welfare, was widespread awareness of societal problems such as
poverty.26 Posters and other advertisements by community chests highlighted the suffering of
impoverished people, with a particular focus on single mothers and children, as well as sick
people, in an attempt to gain the sympathy of middle class and wealthy potential donors.27 This
method of appealing to the sympathy of the potential donor gained wide traction in the
early-to-mid 1930’s, and even in very poor economic conditions, donations rose, suggesting the
success of this tactic.28 This was commensurate with another aspect of advertising by
community chests, which was to suggest not only that this problem existed, but that it was the
obligation of ordinary people to contribute their money to solve this problem. Much of this was
focused specifically on the obligations of the rich – for example, some advertisements portrayed
rich people as lazy or selfish for not donating enough.29 However, other advertisements
suggested that working-class people were obligated to donate as well – Tilloston cites one
advertisement that portrayed a poor person donating because she had previously been helped
when she was in need.30 A diverse array of ideological bents were used to convince as many
Canadians as possible. For example, Christian appeals were used to appeal to the devoutly
religious, but these appeals were cross-denominational, and interspersed with secular
justifications for donations, often within the same ad.31 These central ideas communicated by
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these advertisements – that poverty in Canada was a widespread problem, and that it was one’s
obligation to give up some of their money to fix it – translated very easily to taxation, an
alternate method by which citizens could fulfill their obligations to solve the pressing problem of
poverty.
Next, Tilloston describes the problems that community chests faced after World War II
that caused charity to seem like an inadequate solution to the problems that society faced. In
order to solve the problems of poverty that charities had described in their marketing, they
needed to be able claim to meet the basic needs of the people they served. Unfortunately for
these charities, even with increased giving as a result of the end of World War II, community
chests consistently fell short of the fundraising goals that they set for themselves throughout the
1950’s.32 Although it was by no means a consensus among the populous, charities faced the
widespread perception that a failure to meet their fundraising goals meant a failure to address the
basic needs of poor people.33 As a result of this, two shifts occurred, both of which were part of
Canada’s transition into a greater welfare state. The first was that the federal government began
to directly assist charities, by covering the shortfall between their goals and the money they were
able to raise, through the Canadian Assistance Program. This constituted the government taking
on a role that was previously thought to be the purview of civil society, thus legitimating the
government addressing these services directly.34 The second shift, even more important, was that
many charities began to frame many services, particularly cash assistance to unemployed people,
as the responsibility of the government rather than of charities. In the 1940’s, the federal
government would only provide unemployment assistance to workers that it considered
‘unemployable’ (i.e. sick, elderly, or disabled), leaving thousands more workers with only
32
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charity to rely on.35 In response to this situation, organizations such as the Family Welfare
Bureau, a private charity, began to take the stance that governments should provide basic
necessities such as food and water, and that charities should play only a supplemental role to the
government.36 Thus, the chain of events leading to government intervention was complete:
charities created public awareness of a problem they were unable to solve, while also ushering in
the idea that it was the responsibility of everyday citizens to solve this problem. For both the
charities themselves and ordinary citizens, government intervention seemed like the natural
conclusion. Thus, charities created awareness of a problem that they couldn’t solve, while
helping to give the government the tools to solve it themselves.
This account of Canada’s welfare development seems to bolster the political culture
approach to understanding welfare development. The direct affect of charity activity in Canada
was a shift in Canadian political culture; charity advertising helped to usher the plight of poor
people into the public consciousness, and suggested that it was the responsibility of ordinary
people to solve this problem. As a result, welfare became a more viable government policy; the
voices demanding welfare were strengthened by this development, and the voices against welfare
were weakened. Of course, this one factor was not the only reason that welfare came about in
Canada. For one thing, this shift was just one aspect of Canada’s wider political culture, and
might not have been enough to accelerate welfare development if Canada’s political culture was
as a whole less amicable to welfare development. Although Tilloston does not directly address
other aspects of political culture, Nancy Christie discusses this topic in Engendering the State,
where she describes the way that Canada’s culture surrounding gender in particular accelerated
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and shaped welfare development, by painting women as vulnerable actors who ought to be
protected and supported.
Moreover, this argument does not suggest that political culture is not the only factor that
shapes welfare development. Indeed, while the various approaches to understanding welfare
development are often framed in opposition to each other, with one particular factor claimed to
be the primary reason for welfare development and all others secondary in their explanatory
power, it seems more probable to me that each of these approaches tells part of a broader story.
After all, this shift in political culture may have strengthened the voices in favor of welfare and
weakened the voices against it, but this would have been meaningless without voices in favor of
welfare in the first place, and may not have been enough if Canada’s institutions had made the
passage of welfare more difficult. All of these approaches explain different parts of the process
of the passage of welfare, and while the absence any one of these factors (a favorable political
culture, strong working class organization, and favorable institutions) may be enough to interrupt
welfare development, no one is enough to trigger welfare development on its own where it would
be completely absent otherwise. As we will see later, America’s drop in working class
organization after World War II muted the voices pushing for welfare in America, making the
passage of welfare policies less likely. Likewise, as mentioned above, the increase in business
power that occurred after World War II, as well as the federal government’s numerous veto
points, also hindered welfare development in America. It seems likely that if these factors were
present in Canada, welfare development might have been similarly muted, even with charity
operating the way it did. This is not to say that this shift in political culture had no impact, just
that it would be misleading to suggest it was the only factor that mattered.
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In sum, the argument that will follow in the next two chapters of this project is an
argument about political culture. In these chapters, I identify the differences between the
operation of charities in America and in Canada, and I analyze how these differences resulted in
divergent affects of charity on political culture in America as compared to Canada. Chapter 4
will then contextualize this shift in political culture within America’s broader political culture, as
well as the institutions and levels of working class organization in America, to explain how this
shift in political culture fits in with a broader story.
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Chapter 2: The Mission of Charities

In order for programs such as government-provided health insurance, unemployment
insurance, and family allowances to gain popular support, the populus needs to believe that
helping the poor on an ongoing basis is a worthwhile mission. This is a highly controversial
premise – for as long as there have been proposals for government welfare, there have also been
conservative movements who have argued that the poor are unworthy of government aid. In
Canada, welfare came about because both of this belief overcome, in part because philanthropic
organizations spread the message that society ought to help the poor. One of the fundamental
reasons, however, that American charities had a different effect on welfare development than
Canadian charities is that American charities frequently failed to spread this crucial message.
This chapter will highlight two areas where this failure can be seen. Firstly, American charities
tended to help soldiers, veterans, and their families, rather than all poor people. Secondly,
American charities tended to provide relief to people in the aftermath of disasters, rather than
supporting people on an ongoing basis. As a result of these two factors, American charities
tended not to suggest that all poor people were worthy of help, thus failing to accelerate welfare
development as a result.

Veterans and Their Families as ‘Worthy Poor’
The concept of the ‘worthy’ or the ‘deserving’ poor, who are poor at no fault of their own
and thus deserve government aid, hardly began with mass philanthropy. In Protecting Soldiers
and Mothers, Theda Skocpol describes the philosophical justification behind pensions for Union
Civil War veterans, as well as assistance for their wives and children, which was in place from
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the 1880’s until around World War I. According to Skocpol, whereas European welfare systems
were enacted around the same time to provide modest amounts to people who were economically
disadvantaged, America gave out pensions to veterans because they had “by their own choices
and efforts as young men earned aid – for themselves their dependents” (emphasis in original).
The concept of having earned aid was important to justify giving out these pensions – “No matter
how materially needy, the morally undeserving or less deserving were not the nation’s
responsibility.”37
I want to argue that, to the extent that philanthropy shapes people’s values about who
deserves help and thus acts as a model for state welfare, American mass philanthropy reinforced
the idea of soldiers and their families as ‘deserving poor’ (despite the fact that these veterans
were not always necessarily poor), causing welfare to be oriented around veterans’ benefits, seen
most clearly in the G.I. Bill. This may be counterintuitive, because some charities did in fact
serve all poor people; as Skocpol notes, the Civil War pensions were designed “to keep these
deserving men and those connected to them from the degrading fates of private charity or the
public poorhouse,” indicating that charities served others besides these veterans.38 However,
there is a distinction to be made between philanthropy supported by the wealthy and by religious
organizations – which has existed in America for as long as there have been European
settlements of significant size, which is to say since at least the mid-17th century – and the much
more recent phenomenon of mass philanthropy, which is funded by soliciting small donations
from ordinary individuals from the middle and even working classes. In Contributing Citizens,
Shirley Mae Tilloston focuses on mass philanthropy as the engine that drove ordinary Canadians
to support welfare, and for good reason. Only mass philanthropy involves advertising that
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reaches and shapes the values of broader society, as elite-driven philanthropy requires changing
the minds of only a few wealthy donors, rather than the public at large. This means that the
activities of mass philanthropy can influence the popular mandates of politicians, in a way that
philanthropy funded by religious institutions and wealthy people cannot. Therefore, even though
charities in America were often seen as taking the role of helping the ‘undeserving’ poor who
were unworthy of government help, this does not necessarily speak to the perceived role of mass
philanthropy, and thus to the ways that ordinary Americans thought about poverty.
According to Philanthropy in America by Oliver Zunz, mass philanthropy in America
was virtually non-existent before the 20th century. In the late 19th century, Americans generally
donated no more than 2% of their income to philanthropic organizations, and most of these
donations went to ethnic, religious or fraternal organizations that they belonged to; since people
were expected to receive benefits from their donations, these donations were questionably
charitable.39 This began to change in 1908 with a highly successful program to sell stamps to
benefit tuberculosis research.40 However, while this program and a few others gained some
traction in the next several years, it was not until World War I that mass philanthropy became a
widespread phenomenon. During this period, donations to philanthropic organizations by
ordinary Americans are estimated to have increased elevenfold, and although the Red Cross was
founded during the Civil War, it was only during this period that it assumed its role as the most
prominent philanthropic organization in America, a position it would occupy for several
decades.41 This period also saw the ‘professionalization’ of fundraising, or the development of
specialized firms for fundraising that sold their services to organizations such as charities,
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colleges, and churches.42 Finally, World War I saw the development of numerous tactics that
became staples of future fundraising, such as the ‘blitz campaign’, which will be described in
more detail later in the chapter. Not all of the money raised during this time supported soldiers
directly – some of the money raised went to providing aid to civilians affected by the war.
However, providing support to soldiers, especially in the form of setting up hospitals for the
wounded, was also a central goal.43 As a result, an association was created in the minds of many
Americans between donations to charity and supporting soldiers and the military.
The centrality of war to charity can be demonstrated by the precipitous drop in charitable
donations in America after World War I. To be sure, mass philanthropy was still a much bigger
phenomenon in the 1920’s than it had been before World War I. But the fact that the Red Cross
and many community chests began having more trouble meeting their fundraising goals in this
era is indicative of some association in the minds of Americans between philanthropy and
support of war efforts. This association continued for the next several decades, with the
predictable result being that World War II saw the next major spike in donations. Throughout
most of the period of 1920-1961, community chests expanded at a modest rate; the average
across America was that each year, they typically raised 105-115% of what they had raised the
previous year, with the worst years of the Great Depression actually seeing a decline in
donations. The only positive outlier in this period was 1943, which saw a 156% increase in
revenue.44 Once again, not all of the donations went directly to benefit soldiers – quite a bit of
money also went to aiding civilians affected by the war.45 However, a breakdown of the Red
Cross’ budget during 1942 shows that fully half of the money raised did go to providing soldiers
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with services such as food, hospitals, and even wholesome recreation (so as to help them avoid
‘sinful temptations’).46 While it is of course unsurprising that, in the year 1942, much of the
money raised by the Red Cross would go towards efforts shaped by the ongoing conflict, the Red
Cross could have easily spent more of this money on aiding civilians who, unlike American
soldiers, often lacked a functional government to assist them during the tumult of war.
Moreover, the rhetoric in the advertising campaigns asking for donations was oriented around
soldiers – slogans included “Don’t forget our own soldiers and sailors,” and “The USO [United
Service Organizations for National Defense] is behind the soldiers and sailors of the USA.”47
These slogans not only suggested that soldiers are honorable people worth helping, they also did
so in a way that was frequently explicitly nationalist. For example, in Scott Cutlip’s Fund
Rasing in the United States: Its Role in America’s Philanthropy, often considered the definitive
account of charity fundraising in the first half of the 20th century, Cutlip puts great emphasis on
a radio broadcast by Kate Smith that, in a single day, raised over $39 million for the Red Cross.
Cutlip suggests that Smith, a popular singer best known for her rendition of Irving Berlin’s “God
Bless America,” was appealing to the American public in part because of her image as a
“sincere, selfless patriot.”48
All of this is to suggest that in the minds of Americans, charity was directly associated
with helping soldiers. Moreover, the nationalist rhetoric of the World War II campaigns suggests
that helping soldiers was, through charities, linked to patriotism, an ideal that is difficult to
challenge in American political discourse. The wide reach and, in many cases, enormous
success of these campaigns suggests approval by the general American populus; if they were not
receptive to the messages of these organizations, they probably would not have donated in such
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high numbers. Moreover, these messages, at least to some degree, came instead of – rather than
alongside – messages about the importance of helping the poor through charity, since soldiers
were not usually explicitly said to be poor. This is not to say that American charities did not
work towards poverty alleviation; they certainly did, and this even featured in some of their
advertisements. However, as we will see later, charities often avoided taking full responsibility
for poverty alleviation, and the fact that the fundraising success of charities rose enormously
with each World War suggests that poverty alleviation was likely a side function of charities in
the minds of most Americans, rather than their primary purpose. In this way, charities served to
reinforce the image of soldiers – along with their families – as the ‘deserving poor,’ and others as
less deserving; it did not invent this conception of soldiers, but it did maintain this image in the
public conscious, making it more resistant to efforts by American progressives to expand
concepts of who was deserving of help.
This framing of social responsibilities culminated after World War II with the
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, popularly known as the G.I. Bill, which specifically helped
veterans and their families, rather than any other group of people. The G.I. Bill was a series of
programs – including government-subsidized housing and college education – designed to deal
with the high unemployment that many commentators foresaw after the end of World War II.
This bill’s link to the idea of veterans as deserving poor can be seen clearly upon examination of
the historical context behind how the G.I. Bill was passed. The 1942 midterm Congressional
elections swept forty-two new Republicans into the House of Representatives and seven into the
Senate; this allowed southern Democrats, who tended to be less pro-welfare than their northern
counterparts, to coalition with Republicans to create a majority, giving northern Democrats little
hope of instituting welfare by decree. Despite this, according to The G.I. Bill: A New Deal for
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Veterans by Glen C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, “A bipartisan consensus existed to do
something for the GIs.”49 This consensus, of course, did not arise entirely because of the
conception of veterans as deserving poor. Indeed, Altschuler and Blumin do not mention this
conception at all, instead crediting concern over post-war unemployment and a concerted public
campaign by the American Legion, at the time America’s largest veterans’ organization.50 While
these were certainly the most direct causal factors for the bill’s popularity, this explanation
cannot tell the full story. To the argument of unemployment, this could have been dealt with
through job programs for all Americans, rather than just veterans; and to the argument of the
American Legion’s campaign, this story lacks an explanation for why this campaign was so
resonant with the American people. A program for veterans might not have been the outcome of
these forces if not for the elevation of veterans as a “special group,” as one member of the
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies put it; they had done something special
to earn special treatment.51
This seems especially likely when one considers the great hostility among many of the
supporters of the G.I. Bill to any other kind of welfare program. Altschuler and Blumin describe
in detail the attitudes of the more conservative crafters of the bill, both southern Democrat and
Republican, whose support was necessary for the bill to be passed. These conservatives wanted
to avoid “perverting” the bill into “a pension system or extended furlough pay system,” to avoid
the influence of “crackpots, long-haired professors, and radicals” over the bill, and to avoid
“turning loose on this country a swarm of bureaucrats that would almost equal the locusts of
Egypt,” to quote just some of the colorful ways that Congresspeople and members of the
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American Legion described their fears. In short, the idea of welfare in America was unpopular at
this point, and the narrative of veterans as a special group was required to overcome this
unpopularity. This is consistent with Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta’s description of the
politics of this era, where they note that many of the G.I. Bill’s provisions were based on
slimming down benefits that were originally proposed by the National Resources Planning Board
to apply to all Americans.52 This again demonstrates that benefits for veterans were popular at a
time when no other welfare was, an outcome that would be unlikely if not for the perception of
veterans as a special class.
The story of why Canada does not have the same associations of soldiers as deserving
poor that America does is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worth briefly noting
why philanthropic organizations did not create a similar association between donation and the
military in Canada. The reason seems to relate largely to a few coincidences of historical
development. Firstly, mass philanthropy came to Canada later than it did to the U.S. Most
notably, according to Shirley Mae Tilloston, the first community chest, a major component of
mass philanthropy in its early history, did not come to Canada until after World War I, whereas
they already existed in America before it entered the war.53 Moreover, Canada had a much more
limited involvement in World War II than America did. 38% of Canadian men aged 18-45
served in the war; while the war was certainly impactful on Canada, this pales compared to the
53% of American men in this age range who served.54 The result of this was a lower degree of
mobilization by philanthropic organizations in service of soldiers – this mobilization happened to
some degree, but not to the extent that it happened in America. Because of all of this, Canadian
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philanthropy had no reason to orient itself around soldiers as deserving poor. Instead, Canadian
community chests tended to advertise that they helped the poor in general. This universalist
stance, of course, had limitations; Tilloston notes that advertisements had a persistent tendency to
display white, attractive single mothers as the image of the poor, an image that certainly does not
accurately represent most poor people.55 However, despite this advertising, philanthropic
organizations found themselves supporting racial minorities in Canada to a greater and greater
degree over time, partially as a result of White people in the community chests who opposed
racism, and partially because of a desire not to contribute to racial tensions in Canadian cities.56
The result was that philanthropic organizations served a wide swath of the Canadian poor –
imperfectly, to be sure, but completely enough to serve as a precedent for a broad welfare state.
In sum, charities helped to shape American welfare by reinforcing the image of veterans
as the deserving poor, while failing to elevate other poor people as deserving of help in the same
way, thus creating a situation where the G.I. Bill served as a replacement for more
comprehensive welfare that might have come about otherwise in the same time period.

Emergency Relief
A recurring feature of American charity, which was present to a much lesser degree in
Canada, was that American charity was often framed around emergency relief. In contrast to
Canadian charities, which opened and maintained orphanages and homeless shelters, and which
enacted ongoing programs of food and cash assistance to the poor, American charities frequently
did not support people on an ongoing basis. Instead, they tended to provide assistance during
various emergencies, particularly war or disasters such as tornadoes. This made American
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philanthropy a poor analogy to government welfare programs such as social security or
government-provided health insurance, which help the poor not just during emergencies but on
an ongoing basis. Similarly to the above case of American charities focusing on soldiers rather
than the poor, this orientation around emergency relief served to distance charities from welfare,
meaning that their advertising did not tend to make welfare more popular with the general public,
and welfare programs could not be initiated by the government taking over the tasks of charities.
Just like the focus of American charities on soldiers, this focus on emergency relief also
has its origins in the beginning of American mass philanthropy at the beginning of the 20th
century. As noted above, efforts to raise money to benefit soldiers and civilians during the war
were profoundly formative to mass philanthropy in America; this is the era in which donations
became widespread for the first time, fundraising became professionalized, and many important
tactics of modern fundraising were invented. This origin of mass philanthropy resulted in
advertising campaigns that framed the mission of charity as emergency relief, rather than
sustained aid. World War I was, after all, a temporary event, where all involved knew that the
need for this aid would go away with time. This can be seen in the tactic that Cutlip, in Fund
Raising in America, highlights as the most widely-used and transformative innovation in
fundraising techniques during this era: the ‘blitz campaign,’ or the ‘whirlwind campaign.’ First
pioneered by the YMCA and a standard tool of other organizations such as the Red Cross and the
United War Work Campaign, a blitz campaign involves charities focusing on mobilizing
donations and volunteers for a very short amount of time, hoping to raise a lot of money rapidly,
as an alternative to sustained campaigns over time.57 The blitz campaign reflected the temporary
nature of charity support; the reason that a sustained campaign for fundraising was unnecessary
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was that the goal was not to generate a steady stream of money for an ongoing cause, but to
quickly raise money to combat an urgent emergency.
Developments in philanthropy after the end of WWI show the consequences of this
framing. As noted in the previous section, in the early 1920s, the Red Cross saw a precipitous
drop in funding, with the emergency of the war over.58 Importantly, while the Red Cross
continued to have some success in raising money in major drives following big disasters, the
biggest area where revenues fell was annual membership fees, with subscribers disappearing
rapidly in the period of 1919-1922; without WWI, there was no reason to make contributions
regular.59
Even during the Great Depression, when the needs of poor and unemployed people
became significantly more pressing, the Red Cross kept its orientation around emergency relief.
This manifested itself in two major ways. Firstly, the Red Cross was reticent to provide aid to
people simply because they were poor; instead, the Red Cross focused much of its early efforts
on helping farmers in the dust bowl, which was easier to frame as disaster relief due to the
presence of a drought.60 Secondly, when the Red Cross did provide aid to people simply on the
basis of their being unemployed or poor – such as when local chapters were instructed to
distribute government-owned wheat and cotton to provide food and clothing for the poor – it was
framed as a temporary measure. Indeed, Chairman John Payne worked actively to ensure that
nothing more permanent would arise from this activity, saying that such commodity distribution
was only justified because it could be handled “without creating a precedent” for future work of
this kind.61
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The result of all of this is that neither of the aforementioned ways that charity facilitated
the development of welfare were applicable in America. Philanthropic organizations did not
launch public campaigns that would normalize lasting institutions that existed for the benefit of
the poor; instead, they launched campaigns that normalized temporary emergency relief. This
also meant that unlike in Canada, the government could not establish welfare institutions by
taking over tasks already done by private charity; as we will see in Chapter 3, even in the relief
and welfare that did occur in America, the government had to start from scratch, rather than
overtaking previous institutions. Arguably, this interacts with the concept of the ‘deserving
poor,’ that was outlined in the previous section, crafting victims of disasters into the deserving
poor, as they are suffering through no perceived fault of their own. However, as we will see
shortly, even many of the interventions that helped soldiers directly were temporary as well,
suggesting that even the deserving poor might not be deserving of more than short-term relief.
Regardless of where one stands on this issue, the effects of this precedent can be seen in the two
major incidences of government intervention in the economy for the benefit of ordinary citizens
in the early to mid 20th century: the New Deal and the G.I. Bill.
In discussing how the New Deal was influenced by the precedent of temporary relief
programs, it is important to acknowledge the enormous diversity of New Deal programs, and the
various ideological influences that shaped them. It is true that programs such as Social Security
did continue to provide support to Americans long after the end of the Great Depression, and
other modern programs, such as unemployment insurance, have their origins in the New Deal. It
is even to some extent true that, as scholars such as Ronald Edsforth have argued, the New Deal
was motivated by “a commitment to make federally guaranteed economic security a political
right for every American citizen.”62 However, numerous qualifications need to be made to this
62

Ronald Edsforth, The New Deal: America’s Response to the Great Depression, (Malden: Blackwell, 2000), 2.

38
assessment. Beyond the scope of this paper are the various groups of Americans citizens that
were not given much economic security by the New Deal, and continue to lack it today, such as
African-Americans and Native Americans living on reservations. But to reconcile Edsforth’s
assessment of the New Deal with the precedent I have described of temporary relief programs,
two things should be noted. Firstly, a large number of New Deal programs, especially the early
ones, were in fact framed as providing only temporary relief or employment, and were phased
out after the end of the Depression. The form of this relief varied, and was often focused on
employment rather than food or monetary aid (through programs such as the Civilian
Conservation Corps or the Works Progress Administration), but the temporary nature of these
programs was a common thread.63 One of these programs was even called the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, a name evocative of the emergency campaigns waged by the
Red Cross.64 Secondly, as I will describe in more detail in Chapter 3, to the extent that the New
Deal had ambitions to make economic security a reality for every American citizen, it fell far
short of this goal, especially in creating lasting change during and immediately after World War
II. During this period, proposals to continue aid programs and to create a national health
insurance program failed to pass Congress, and Congress approved massive tax cuts even over
vetoes from both Roosevelt and Truman.65 In sum, while there were certainly forces pushing the
New Deal to include more long-lasting and substantial reforms, and these forces even won out on
many occasions, the effect of precedents for temporary relief programs were also influential in its
development, and the New Deal may have focused more on lasting reform and less on temporary
reforms otherwise.
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In the previous section, I discussed the ways that the G.I. Bill can be understood as an
outgrowth of the focus of American charities on helping soldiers. Equally relevant, however, is
the influence of charities in creating a precedent for temporary interventions rather than ongoing
ones. Although the subsidized housing and college degrees of the G.I. Bill had some lasting
effects on the development of American universities and suburbs, they were meant to deal with
the unemployment crisis and not to be a lasting regime of benefits for veterans or for broader
society. This is demonstrated by the substantially skimpier benefits given to veterans of the
Korean War less than a decade later.66 It is worth recalling, as well, that the G.I. Bill has its
origins in a 1943 report by the National Resources Planning Board, a New Deal agency that was
dissolved by Congress shortly after releasing its report, which recommended that the government
should grant Americans benefits such as subsidized housing and health insurance. The G.I. Bill
applied many of these recommendations, but instead of granting them to all Americans in a
sustained fashion, it applied these benefits only to veterans of WWII; not to any other
Americans, nor to any future veterans.67 This again demonstrates not just the popularity of
veterans as the recipients of help, but also the difficulty in creating long-lasting welfare
programs, compared to the relative ease with which government programs could be created on a
temporary basis to respond to emergencies.
In short, the mission of charities is one of the primary factors that determines whether
charity activity accelerates or hinders welfare development. Charities shape public opinion who
is worthy of help, and in what way that help should be executed; this has influence over what
sorts of welfare policies people support. The government also sometimes takes over the
operations of charities, providing another way that charities can shape government actions.
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Therefore, by suggesting that it was the role of charities to help veterans and disaster victims,
rather than the poor as a whole, charities lessened welfare development.
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Chapter 3: Charities and the Government

For as long as there have been proposals for government-provided welfare, there have
also been Conservative movements claiming that services such as housing and cash transfers to
the poor are a function of private philanthropy rather than the state. Like the belief that the poor
are underserving of help, this is another belief that must be overcome in order for substantial
welfare to be enacted. In Canada, this belief was overcome through the activities of charities,
who lobbied for the government to enact more welfare policies, and who allowed the
government to take over their operations. This chapter will describe the divergent activities of
American charities, which actively encouraged the idea that their operations should remain
separate from the government, and in doing so, did little to combat the perception that the
government should not help the poor.
In Contributing Citizens, Shirley Mae Tilloston describes how Canadian community
chests found themselves, from the 1930’s onward, overwhelmed with the task of providing
housing and food to unemployed Canadians. The chests were consistently getting large numbers
of donations, but not large enough to meet their goals, which was becoming a source of public
embarrassment.68 As a result, the community chests began to take the public stance that
governments should take greater responsibility for taking care of the poor. For example, George
Hart, the director of the Halifax community chest, framed inadequate public assistance as one of
the most pressing problems facing the poor, and lobbied both publicly and privately for the
expansion of government assistance programs. Scholars such as James Struthers and Gale Wills
have credited these pressures from Canada’s fundraising community with the passage of
68
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Canada’s 1956 Unemployment Assistance Act, considered an important turning point in
Canada’s federal government taking a greater direct role in providing for the poor.69 In this way,
governments took over activities previously done by charities, even sometimes using the same
tools and infrastructure that charities had used. Moreover, also in response to this lobbying, the
federal government began to provide direct monetary assistance charities.70 These developments
constituted the government taking on a role that was previously thought to be the purview of
civil society, thus legitimating the government addressing these services directly.
In order for this to happen, two factors had to come about in congruence with each other.
Firstly, charities needed to believe that they were struggling with funding, and that they were
failing to meet goals that they had set for themselves. Secondly, charities needed to frame the
government as an organization that could solve this problem of funding, meaning that a turn to
government assistance was the natural move in response to this crisis. As we will see below,
neither of these factors came about in America, meaning that America lacked the crucial push for
welfare programs that helped to nudge Canada towards greater government assistance.
Firstly, philanthropic organizations in America never entered a period of difficulty in
reaching their fundraising goals the way that Canadian ones did. The United Community Funds
and Councils of America (UCFCA), a council that served to loosely centralize American
community chests, recorded the aggregate funds raised by all campaigns by all community chests
in the U.S. each year from 1920 to 1961, as well as whether these campaigns, on average, met
their fundraising goals. In this 42-year period, there were only four years in which American
community chests raised less than 90% of their goals – 1933-1935, during the depths of the
Great Depression, and 1946, after the end of World War II.71 Particularly noteworthy is the quick
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recovery that American community chests made in the decade after World War II; although there
was a brief period of crisis in which numerous community chests failed to meet their goals, they
were able to solve this crisis and thrive throughout the 1950’s due to greater national
consolidation of local community chests and greater support from business leaders such as Henry
Ford II.72 As noted above, this period corresponds with a much more protracted crisis in funding
among Canadian community chests, prompting them to begin lobbying the federal government
for assistance. Even after World War I, when charities in America faced a fall in fundraising (not
captured in the UCFCA data, which starts in 1920), this did not constitute a crisis, because this
fall in fundraising coincided with the end of a major mandate, that being to help soldiers and
civilians harmed by World War I.
Why did Canadian community chests face difficulties after WWII while American ones
did not? One reason might be that wealthy capitalists were a less prominent feature of the
Canadian economic landscape, meaning that Canadian community chests could not resolve their
crisis by turning to these capitalists for financial support. More substantially, however, is the fact
that the charities supported by Canadian community chests took on the task of addressing
poverty in Canada in a sustained manner, something that American community chests did not do.
As noted above, American philanthropic organizations often oriented themselves around
addressing emergencies, rather than ongoing issues in society. This was a task for which it
proved much easier to raise funds, because it only required a short burst of revenue, rather than a
sustained flow. The blitz campaigns were effective in raising this money, for which no
equivalent exists for an organization that needs money on an ongoing basis. Moreover, even
when American community chests did take on the role of poverty alleviation, they did so in a
much more limited capacity than the Canadian ones did. In Fund Raising in America, Scott
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Cultip lists the demands facing community chests in this era: “increased numbers of family
breakdowns, a rise in juvenile delinquency, racial problems, and a greatly increased demand for
more recreational facilities.”73 While Cutlip does not elaborate on the solutions that charities
found to all of these problems, it is hard to imagine that they were as costly or ambitious as
providing basic necessities to all of the poor that the Canadian government considered
‘employable,’ which was the task facing Canadian charities around the same time. The result is
that American philanthropic organizations faced a much shorter and more moderate drop in
fundraising after the end of World War II, whereas Canadian organizations faced a sustained
crisis. As a result, American philanthropic organizations had little need to reach out to the
government for help; the process that helped to accelerate welfare development in Canada never
occurred in America.
Even more important, however, is that charities did not just neglect to reach out to the
government for help – at multiple points in their history, they have actively rejected help from
the government when it was offered. In examining the aforementioned data from the UCFCA
about when community chests succeeded and failed at meeting their fundraising goals, one might
expect the Great Depression, rather than the post-war period, to be the the period when American
community chests reached out to the government for help, as the early-to-mid 1930’s was the
only protracted period during which community chests fell significantly short of their goals.74
Instead, the exact reverse happened. In 1931, Congressional Democrats, apparently unprompted
by anyone within the philanthropic sector, proposed an appropriation of $25 million to the Red
Cross, “for the purpose of supplying food, medicine, medical aid, and other essentials to afford
adequate relief in the present national emergency to persons otherwise unable to procure the
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same.”75 The Red Cross immediately stated that it would refuse this money, even though it
would have meant exceeding their fundraising goal for the entire year of 1931 by 250%. This is
consistent with the longstanding stance of the Red Cross of separating private and public
funding. During World War I, Henry P. Davison, chairman of the Red Cross War Council,
warned against government support of philanthropic organizations, believing that for the Red
Cross to become dependent on government funding would result in the government having an
inordinate degree of control as to how the Red Cross operated. This stance continued into the
Great Depression, even when the need for funding was more dire than ever, with the Red Cross
stating that accepting government funding would “involve the Red Cross in work duplicating
that of other agencies, impose responsibilities that could not be adequately met, and completely
destroy the voluntary character of Red Cross activity.”76
This serves as another reason that, unlike in Canada, philanthropic organizations in
America never reached out to the government for help, meaning that part of the process that
made welfare into a legitimate task of the government never occured in America. Indeed, when
the government did begin to engage in welfare in a more serious fashion, under the New Deal,
the government had to take steps to establish welfare as the role of the government rather than
charities. In May 1933, Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Secretary of Commerce,
announced that all public relief funds would be administered by public agencies, which
according to Cutlip served as a symbolic rejoinder to private philanthropic organizations who
might try to provide relief of their own.77 Instead of philanthropic organizations providing space
and legitimacy for the government to aid poor people, the government had to actively carve out
this role for itself.
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In short, in order for charities to accelerate welfare development, they must foster a
relationship with the government that is amicable to such development. The charities must ask
for, or at least be willing to accept, help from the government, in order to legitimize government
action in the realm of helping the poor. If charities lobby the government to enact welfare, and
accept government help, then they can help to combat the narrative that helping the poor is the
exclusive purview of charities. If, instead, they reject government help and do not lobby the
government to enact welfare, they can fail to change, or even reinforce, this narrative.
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Chapter 4: The Wider Context

As I argued in Chapter 1, charity activities – specifically, their advertising and their
interactions with the government – result in a shift in a country’s political culture. In order to
fully understand how that shift in political culture will affect policy outcomes, it is necessary to
analyze the context surrounding this shift in political culture. As a result, I will analyze two
things in this chapter. I will talk firstly about the wider aspects of American political culture that
did not change as a result of charity activity. Then, I will talk about the other factors I identified
in Chapter 1 that affect welfare development: a country’s level of working class organization,
and the way that its institutions shape which policies are passed. As we will see, all of these
additional factors were also not amicable to welfare development. As a result of these differing
circumstances, I will argue that even to the extent that charities in America made Americans
aware of poverty at the same time that Canadians were made aware of poverty largely through
charity (which is to say, in the 1930’s-1950’s), this was not enough to spur middle-class
Americans into supporting welfare. This was due to a variety of circumstances that made
economic growth, in service of full employment, seem to most Americans to be a more attractive
goal, both for the purpose of promoting general prosperity, and for the purpose of helping the
poor in particular.

Political Culture: The Second Red Scare
Obviously, any response by the U.S. government to poverty needs to be formulated and
executed by people working for the government; this is to say, legislators and civil servants.
These people may be under certain pressures from the electorate, but they are in control of how
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they formulate that response. The context of the second red scare, and the resulting purge of
communists and other leftists from the federal government, is therefore crucial in understanding
the federal government’s actions in the 40’s and 50’s. The second red scare (taking place after
World War II, and in contrast to the first red scare, taking place after World War I) is most
commonly associated with Joseph McCarthy and the investigations that he oversaw. However,
according to The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left by Landon R.Y.
Storrs, the attempt to purge the federal government of communist influence predates McCarthy’s
fame and cult of personality; it can be traced back to the 1940’s, and was formalized and
accelerated in 1947 when Truman founded a ‘loyalty program’ to identify and weed out
communists in the federal government.78 In total, this program caused almost 15,000 people to
leave federal employment, whether through direct dismissal or through pressuring suspected
employees into resignation, in the decade of 1947-1956.79 Most of them were likely not
affiliated with the Communist Party, but were instead a wider amalgamation of people, including
socialists, social democrats, and other leftists, as well as people who may not have held any
exceptionally left-wing views, but were instead targeted simply for being women or for being
(presumed) gay.80 According to Storrs, the effect that this program had on the makeup of the
federal government was dramatic, and in my opinion, is often understated. Not only were many
of the voices that were instrumental in the crafting of the New Deal removed from the
government, but even those who remained were almost certainly deterred from expressing
left-wing ideas, lest they be accused of being communists.81 Storrs notes that numerous people
who began working for the federal government in the 1930’s and expressed support for ideas
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such as feminism, racial equality, wealth redistribution, and most relevantly to this paper,
expanded welfare programs such as a national healthcare system, stopped publicly expressing
support for these ideas during the loyalty program, and phrased their ambitions in more centrist
terms even during the less hostile Kennedy and Johnson administrations.82
The implications of this development on responses to poverty by the federal government
are obvious. In the context of the curtailment of civil liberties targeted at leftists, for a civil
servant to suggest a welfare program as a solution to poverty was dangerous throughout much of
the 1940’s and 50’s. As is evidenced by the fact that most of the leftists who remained in the
government continued to support more moderate policies even after the end of the loyalty
program, these investigations created a lasting stigma on proposals for welfare. This may have
some explanatory power over the limited ambitions of some of the Great Society programs, such
as the fact that Medicare provided only for poor Americans, at a time when other industrialized
democracies were instituting universal healthcare programs. More directly, however, it suggests
that to the extent that Americans were aware of poverty in the 1940’s and 1950’s, and to the
extent that the government was interested in addressing these concerns, other solutions had to be
found, due to this shift in political culture that made welfare a much less tenable idea.

The Decline of Working Class Organization
The 1940’s and 50’s saw a decline in the membership and structural power of labor
unions. This is part of a larger arc in the history of organized labor in America, whose power has
been declining since it peaked with the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935. In the 1940’s and
1950’s, however, several specific developments occurred that proved turning points for
organized labor. In Prisoners of the American Dream, Mike Davis documents the rise of a new
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order, consisting of individually negotiated employee contracts containing employer-provided
benefits, as a replacement for organized bargaining.83 This era saw the first ‘right to work’ laws,
implemented mostly in sun-belt states such as Georgia, Arkansas, and Arizona, that prevented
deals requiring every worker in a company to be part of a union.84 Companies also took
advantage of the numerous categories of workers that were not allowed to unionize by
categorizing workers as management or sales staff, rather than ordinary workers, as often as
possible; as a result, as much as 50% of the workforce was not allowed to unionize by the late
1950’s.85 Throughout this decade, IBM innovated new methods of controlling and placating a
non-unionized workforce. On the one hand, they adopted individualistic replacements for
collective bargaining, such as their ‘open door policy’, which allowed any employee to speak to
upper-level management about complaints; on the other hand, they controlled information
stringently, not allowing employees to post their own fliers on company billboards, while
regularly publishing company fliers and magazines to innandate company loyalty. This
approach, known as ‘Boulwarism,’ became widely taught in business schools and was quickly
adopted by other major companies such as GE and Chrysler.86
The cumulative effect of these developments was a decrease in union membership
throughout this decade. This did not always translate to fewer benefits for workers, as many
companies adopted policies such as employment-provided pensions and health insurance that
were meant to preempt the need for collective bargaining (although it certainly resulted in less
control by employees over the benefits they received).87 What it did result in, however, was a
decrease in the power of unions as organizations. This is important because, as Michael Shalev
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notes in “The Social Democratic Model and Beyond,” labor unions often function beyond simply
negotiating with employers, but also act as a source of left-wing activism on behalf of the
working class.88 As a result of this, a decline in union membership can be credited with a
weakened push for welfare during this era.

Institutional Factors: Capital Reasserts Itself
Another factor making welfare less feasible as a solution to poverty, to the extent that
Americans were aware of it, was the return of business power after the Great Depression. In
“Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare
State,” Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson analyze the effect of business power on American
welfare development. They note that businesses, as a group, generally oppose welfare, because
welfare increases the bargaining power of workers (by giving them a safety net to fall back on if
their employer does not give them ideal pay and conditions) and because the cost of welfare is
generally borne by businesses in the form of higher taxes. As a result of this, to the extent that
businesses have power, they are likely to use it against the provision of welfare, suggesting that
even if Americans were aware of poverty, if businesses are able to enact their interests, there will
be an institutional barrier to welfare as a solution to this problem.
Hacker and Pierson identify two types of business power: ‘structural’ power (or the
importance of businesses in the economy in providing jobs, goods, and tax revenue, thus making
it unappealing for politicians to cause businesses to suffer), and ‘instrumental’ power (or the
power of businesses to directly influence government, through methods such as lobbying or more
direct corruption such as bribery).89 As noted in Chapter 1, during the Great Depression, both
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types of power were at an unusually low point. The structural power of businesses was
diminished by their plummeting fortunes; with so many unemployed, and with businesses
already investing so much less than usual in the economy, the cost of further harming businesses
was much smaller than usual.90 At the same time, the instrumental power of businesses also fell,
due to the election of the Democrats, who were less susceptible to business pressure than
Republicans. This was what allowed the Great Depression to be a unique turning point for
American welfare policy, with the creation of social security and many other more temporary
programs to help poor Americans.
However, this moment proved fleeting. After the Great Depression, the power of
businesses rose again, meaning that in the 1940’s and 50’s, when Canada was implementing
welfare policies, businesses were able to oppose them in America. Firstly, the structural power
of businesses rose to their previous heights as a natural consequence of the economy recovering
– once they were again employing people, and once they were again providing significant tax
revenue, it again became dangerous to harm business interests, meaning that politicians began to
once more shy away from doing so. Likewise, while the Repblican party of the post-Depression
was not as corrupt and openly representative of business interests as the party before the
Depression, businesses did regain much of their instrumental power through the aforementioned
decline of labor power, giving businesses less competition for the ears of politicians.91

Full Employment as an Alternative Goal
The previous three sections have argued that various factors made welfare programs
generally untenable as a solution to poverty in the 1940’s and 50’s, even to the extent that the
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public was aware of poverty in America and desired to see a solution to it. This prompts the
question of what served as the alternate solution. This alternate solution came in the form of a
government striving for full employment which, by the 1950’s, could be achieved by stimulating
business growth, and allowing the private sector to serve roles such as the provision of pensions
and health insurance. It is worth noting that full employment did not necessarily serve to address
poverty specifically, in the minds of many voters and policy makers, but rather served the
broader goal of benefiting all Americans by strengthening the economy. Despite this, it is
certainly the case that these policies were framed in the name of class mobility to some extent,
making them relevant to the discussion of how America decided to address poverty.
The roots of a ‘full employment’ orientation of government policy can be found in the
New Deal. According to Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, after spending most of 1933
focused on passing relief policies, Roosevelt began to focus more on public employment from
1934 on, shifting the provision of relief efforts to the states.92 This orientation around
employment was a feature of many New Deal programs, such as the National Youth
Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the Works Progress Administration, which
employed a combined total of almost 3.5 million Americans by 1939.93 This set a precedent of
full employment as a legitimate and necessary government aim. However, public employment as
a means to this end became less popular with the American public after the employment crisis of
the Great Depression ended, and the industrial mobilization of World War II created skyrocketing
employment throughout the U.S. In this context, surveys conducted at the time found that
ordinary Americans saw little point to government-sponsored employment programs.94 As a
result, American policy shifted to preserving a situation where full employment was guaranteed
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by private businesses, fueling the post-war boom in America.95 Sometimes, this took the form of
subsidies to private companies to directly provide employment, such as Truman’s policy of
subsidizing the private development of housing in lieu of a public housing program, with the
dual aim of providing more housing and creating employment in the meantime.96 Just as often,
however, this approach simply meant a U.S. government less active in social policy, with the
onus shifted to businesses to provide to the American people.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the private provision through employment benefits of
services that, in other countries, were offered as government entitlements, such as social security,
health insurance, and even unemployment insurance. This system arose after World War II,
explicitly framed by businesses as an alternative to government-provided programs.97 Notably,
these systems were almost always put in place without negotiation or even consultation with
unions; rather, they were done as unilateral moves by corporations to attract workers and to
increase the reliance of workers on the company.98 These systems, while put in place partially as
a result of the employment-focused strategy of the American government (since this strategy left
a gap in areas such as health insurance that employment on its own does not provide), also
compounded the government’s focus on employment, by making employment more important to
the average American, while supplanting the need for government-provided welfare programs.99
Thus, by giving workers a wage and the programs that might otherwise have been provided by
governments, full employment replaced welfare as the favored solution to poverty, even to the
extent that philanthropic organizations might have made Americans aware of poverty as a
problem.
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions

The comparison between the U.S. and Canada with regard to the influence of mass
philanthropy on the development of welfare suggests that mass philanthropy can make welfare
more likely to come about, but it does not inevitably cause more welfare development. Rather,
three things are significant in whether mass philanthropy causes welfare and what kind of
welfare results: how charities frame the problem in their advertising; whether they suggest that
the government is legitimate in solving this problem; and the broader political cultural,
institutional, and labor organizational factors present.
The first consideration is how charities frame the problem they are trying to solve in their
public campaigning. This is important because when charities advertise with the goal of
attracting donations from a wide swath of society in order to solve a particular problem, they
make the public aware of that problem, and suggest that it is legitimate that people ought to give
up some of their money in order for this problem to be solved. Therefore, government action to
solve that problem becomes more acceptable, perhaps even actively desired by the electorate.
There are numerous ways that charities can choose to frame the problem that they are trying to
address. For example, do they frame themselves as aiding the poor on an ongoing basis, as the
Canadian charities did, or do they frame themselves as helping only in an emergency capacity, as
American charities did? This affects both the likelihood and the form of welfare development
that results from the influence of mass philanthropy. Ongoing poverty is seen by most people to
be a more pressing problem than a temporary crisis, meaning that this framing by charities is
more likely to accelerate welfare development. But even when welfare development does result
from charities that fix temporary crises, the welfare will be different in form. Temporary
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programs, such as one-time cash transfers or short-term job programs – perhaps justified in the
name of ‘stimulus’ – are the likely result of this framing, rather than more steady programs to
provide things such as health insurance or cash. Another way that charities can frame the
problem they are trying to solve is to make choices about who they focus on as the recipients of
aid in their advertising. If they advertise that they are helping poor people generally, as Canadian
charities did, they can spread awareness of and sympathy towards the plight of poor people in
society, making welfare more likely; on the other hand, if they advertise that they are helping
specific groups, such as soldiers and veterans, they can instead nudge society to replace welfare
for all citizens with programs designed to help veterans and their families in specific.
The second consideration is the relationship that charities foster with the government.
Philanthropic organizations are frequently seen as competitors with the government for
providing aid to impoverished people. This need not be the case, however. In Canada,
community chests actively reached out to the government for assistance, prompting the
government to respond to their increasingly vocal and public demands for action by taking over
many tasks previously left to charities, such as providing long-term housing for the poor. In the
case of Canada, this was due to the high mandate that charities took upon themselves, of
providing homeless shelters, food aid, and even some healthcare for poor people. However, in
theory, this high mandate is not necessary; all that is required is for the philanthropic
organization to use its influence and credibility to push the government to providing similar tasks
to itself. But charities can instead take the opposite approach, leaning into the common
conception that it would be illegitimate for the government to do the work that the charity is
doing. This was the case in America, where organizations such as the Red Cross rejected
massive sums of money from the government, even though such money would have allowed the
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organization to massively expand its work, on the basis that charities should be independent of
the government. This activity makes it less legitimate for the government to perform welfare
functions, rather than more legitimate, decreasing the push for such policies in society.
The third consideration is the political culture, institutional conditions, and level of
working class organization of the society in which the charity operates. As discussed in Chapter
3, all three of these factors were hostile to the development of welfare during the 1950s, the time
period in which Canada enacted a host of welfare programs. America’s political culture was
dominated by the politics of the Red Scare, in which left-leaning ideas were stigmatized, and
even dangerous to express. Institutionally, America saw the structural power of businesses rise
after the end of the Great Depression, and these businesses tended to oppose welfare, making it
difficult to implement new welfare policies. Finally, corresponding with these trends, labor
power in the U.S. fell during the 1940’s and ‘50’s, with the passage of ‘right to work’ laws and
the adoption of new legal and rhetorical tactics by corporations to prevent their workers from
unionizing. These factors cannot be ascertained by looking directly at how charities operate;
rather, understanding them requires looking at the context in which these charities exist. This
suggests the explanatory power of the methods by which charities operate has limits; they are
only one of many elements that affect the development of welfare. It is unclear, from this
comparison, that a charity that frames the problem in a way that is helpful to welfare
development and suggests that the government should solve this problem would be able to
overcome operating within a society that was not amenable to welfare development for other
reasons, and it seems unlikely that charity is a necessary prerequisite for welfare development.
Charity makes welfare development more likely, when it operates in the ideal ways, but it does
not make or break welfare development.
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Chapter 6: Final Remarks

Over the past decade or so, a movement called Effective Altruism has grown in
popularity. Its adherents aim to spend time and money in a way that maximizes efficiency in
improving the world, as measured by a strictly utilitarian metric. For example, GiveWell is an
organization that identifies and researches charities that produce the most utility per dollar
donated, and 80,000 Hours provides advice on how young people can shape their careers in such
a way that does the most good (such as earning high salaries in order to donate much of their
income, or entering fields such as medical research that directly benefit the world). This
movement has attracted many dedicated supporters, but has also attracted its share of criticism,
especially from socialists. For example, “Against Charity,” A Jacobin article by Matthew Snow,
argues that such philanthropy must work through the mechanisms of the very capitalist systems
that oppress the poor in the first place – to give food to a poor person, after all, you must first
purchase that food, almost certainly from one of the multinational corporations whose actions
contributed to global poverty arising in the first place. As a result, Snow argues, charity
exacerbates the very problem it aims to solve, because working to improve the world under
capital’s terms only strengthens said capital.100
This is emblematic of a larger debate about the role of charity in making the world a
better place. There is, on the one hand, a desire to help people in need as directly as possible.
For this goal, charity seems like the obvious solution – if people lack housing, it’s a lot easier to
simply build a homeless shelter than to identify which government policies and corporate
activities have caused them to lack housing and dedicate years of activism towards changing this
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situation. As one Canadian 1933 community chest advertisement put it, “Shall we stop to argue
about the rights and wrongs of why suffering should exist? Shall we quibble about other
possible – or impossible – ways of meeting it? No! Let’s act as our hearts dictate!”101 On the
other hand, it seems like a more desirable goal to redistribute wealth, in order to remove the
structural factors that cause people to lack their basic rights and require charity in the first place.
If corporations and governments are causing people to be poor – by perpetuating or failing to
address the racism, sexism, ableism, and so on that cause marginalized groups to suffer
disproportionately, or by paying too low and charging extortionate prices for basic necessities, to
name just two examples – it seems that any solution that works through these structures rather
than altering or abolishing them can only mitigate the problem.
It is hardly a revelation that it is a false dichotomy to say, ‘we must either make people’s
lives better now or focus on structural change.’ Organizations from the Black Panthers to Food
Not Bombs have focused on both providing services to their community and pushing for
structural change through various means. But what is revelatory about Contributing Citizens is
the argument that charity – making people’s lives better in the short-term – can potentially
contribute to structural change even when this is not a primary aim of the organization in
question, even when the organization is working within capitalist structures, even when the
organization is run not by marginalized people aiming to help their own community but by
wealthy people. Tilloston points to the power these organizations can have in shaping the
agendas of governments, both directly through their lobbying and indirectly through shaping
public thought. It is true that the change it has brought about is moderate – Canada still has
inequality, discrimination, and a host of other problems. But public healthcare programs,
unemployment insurance, and family allowances in Canada have been, for many people, the
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difference between life and death. Moreover, it is not necessarily outside of the realm of
possibility for awareness of poverty to be harnessed for more radical ends – middle class
awareness of poverty can only be a boon to movements that seek to alleviate that poverty. This
makes the way that mass philanthropy interacts with welfare development specifically, and
government change more broadly, worth understanding. Tilloston suggests a greater nuance to
the debate of whether charity should or should not be prioritized over structural change, making
more plausible that even when the charities we are talking about are large organizations run by
the wealthy, we need not assume that we must choose one or the other.
However, my project suggests that it would be a vast overstatement to say that these
elite-run charities are an unmitigated good. In the American context, it seems reasonable to
believe that they did harm welfare development, by supplanting the perceived need for
government assistance, by actively refusing government assistance that could have been a step in
legitimizing the government taking an active role in helping the poor, and by shaping images of
who is deserving of help such that welfare for the general populous became less likely. Charity
can help – but it would be wrong to therefore dismiss the socialist concern that it does harm.
Moreover, I agree with the socialist stance that ultimately, the ideal world is one in which
charities would be unnecessary. It is worth acknowledging here that mass philanthropy in
America was inspired by the philanthropic activities of capitalists such as Carnegie and
Rockefeller. Carnegie’s “Gospel of the Wealth,” his famous treatise on why and how
philanthropy should be done, actively opposes wealth redistribution, and suggests that money
should not be given directly to poor people because they are likely to spend it badly.102 This is a
fundamentally undemocratic way of helping the poor, denying their agency and ignoring their
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wishes in actions supposedly taken for their benefit. Nor does it create a just world when a poor
person's ability to feed themselves and their family depends on the whims of rich donors, or
when they are forced to work for another person’s profit just to survive. While Carnegie himself
never spearheaded any organizations that engaged in mass philanthropy, instead preferring to
donate his own money directly, the mass philanthropy that arose in the early 20th century was
inspired by Carnegie and the other capitalists of the Gilded Age, both in their attitudes and their
activities. Organizations such as the Red Cross and the various local community chests
throughout America were typically run by rich people, and they tended to lack any way for poor
people to direct the aid that they were receiving. In these ways, even when these charities are
instrumental in bringing about structural change, they also operate in unjust ways.
What does all of this mean for people who wish to bring about a more just and equitable
society? My answer is this: charities have the potential to bring about structural change through
their ability to shape public thought and their ability to lobby governments. While this does
sometimes happen ‘organically’ (i.e. without the interference of people who want to utilize
charities for this aim), there is potential for leftists to actively push charities in this direction, by
either working for these charities and nudging them in this direction from the inside, or by
demanding from the outside that these charities take on higher mandates and alter their
advertising so that they use their power for good. Because of the various problems with charities
that I have outlined above, this is not an ideal tactic to be used, and protests, electoral
movements, and other such tactics should be used instead when they are effective. But
influencing charities has the crucial advantage of being effective when these other tactics would
be difficult – for example, in times or places where organized labor is repressed, or when
marginalized people do not flip elections and thus go ignored by politicians. This tactic does not
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require a high level of organization among the working class, it does not require political
circumstances to be such that marginalized people flip elections, and it can be done even when
government repression might make protesting dangerous. Moreover, charities often actively try
to avoid politicization – while that often makes them ill-suited to bringing about radical change,
it also means that a particularly anti-welfare public may be receptive to their messaging when
they would not be receptive to other, more openly partisan messaging. This means that charities
may be able to make people aware of and sympathetic towards poor people when openly liberal
or socialist organizations would not be able to. When radical change is beyond the realm of
achievement, aiming for more moderate change that will vastly improve people’s lives is far
better than nothing, even though there will be more work to be done afterward. While there is
reason to be sympathetic to the socialist critique of charities, and such pragmatic concerns are
often dissatisfying to those wanting to make the world into a just place, it seems to me that to
reject this tactic as a result would be to make the perfect the enemy of the good.
In applying the observations of my project to modern activism, one final consideration is
the ways that mass philanthropy has changed since the era I have described. While there are
numerous continuities and changes, the change that strikes me as most significant is that today,
many charities in the West benefit people in the global South, something almost unheard of in the
time period my project covers. Indeed, effective altruism, the movement mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, orients itself entirely around charities that benefit the global South
(usually in the fields of either disease reduction or education), and organizations such as Doctors
Without Borders and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation that work extensively in the global
south are among the charities that have received the most donations in the last decade.103 This
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offers the potential for a new way in which the reform triggered by charities need not be
restricted to welfare development; foreign aid is another reform that could be made more likely
by the activities of charities. Indeed, contemporaneously with the rise of charities that serve the
global South, the foreign aid budgets of many developed nations grew. Further research is
needed to determine whether charities had any causal relationship to this increase in
governmental foreign aid, or if these trends merely share a common cause. Nonetheless, for any
activists interested in using charity to advance reform, this appears to be an important area of
interest. Indeed, these charities demonstrate both the strengths and drawbacks of this method of
activism. On the one hand, both these charities and the foreign aid they may have helped to
trigger have in fact done good, by providing food, infrastructure, public health programs, and
disaster relief to parts of the world that may never have developed these things otherwise.
However, they also largely deny the people of the global south agency in how this aid is
administered, and these charities frequently portray the global south inaccurately, caricaturing
people of the global south as uniformly poor, underdeveloped, and passive victims of their
circumstances.
Despite this drawback, this shift in the operations of charity should give us hope that the
bad aspects of charity can in fact be reformed. I highlighted earlier that mass philanthropy
retains much of the orientation of the philanthropy spearheaded by Carnegie and other capitalists.
However, this should not be taken to mean that path-dependency will prevent charities from
evolving. Indeed, while the effective altruists are hardly socialists, their influence over the
direction of charity – with malaria nets in particular being a much more common intervention in
recent years due to their research and influence – demonstrates the power that an organized
movement can have over how charities operate. Creating a global order that is more equal, in
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which charity is unnecessary, is certainly a desirable goal. But reforming charity, and perhaps
even strengthening its best aspects, whether from the inside or the outside, can help bring us
closer to that world.
Winners Take All by Anand Giridharadas, the book that provides the epigraph to this
project, writes about a situation that I identify with. He describes privileged college students
immersing themselves, during their formative years, in a culture that suggests that it is their
obligation to make the world a better place. These college students often graduate unsure as to
how to do this, and find themselves in careers as consultants, programmers for tech startups, or
financial executives for hedge funds. These organizations promise that their employees can do
good for the world through various means – by investing in green companies, or by creating apps
that help the poor – but this is most often a fiction created so that these companies can attract the
most qualified employees. While Giridharadas eloquently exposes this scam for what it is, he
regrettably does not provide alternative paths for privileged college students who sincerely want
to make the world better. I hope that my project can, in some small way, lead to an answer to
this question. Charity is often written off as a band-aid solution to the world’s problems, and not
without reason. But my project suggests that doing charity right – doing it with awareness to
how it shapes public thought and government action – is a genuinely important endeavor that can
help or harm communities far more than the services these charities directly provide. This is far
from the only path to improving the world with one’s career – and I confess, not my path of
choice – but it is regrettable that this path has been ignored.
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